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Peer-Reviewed Articles
Decision and Foreknowledge. forthcoming at Nous.
Causal Counterfactuals without Miracles or Backtracking. forthcoming at Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
It Can Be Irrational to Knowingly Choose the Best. forthcoming at the Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
The Sure Thing Principle Leads to Instability. forthcoming at Philosophical Quarterly.
Two-Dimensional De Se Chance Deference. forthcoming at the Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
Local and Global Deference. 2023. Philosophical Studies 180 (9): 2753–2770. DOI: 10.1007/s11098-023-02003-8.
Indifference to Anti-Humean Chances. 2022. Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 52/5:485–501. DOI: 10.1017/can.2022.36
Escaping the Cycle. 2022. Mind 131 (521): 99–127. DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzab047.
Riches and Rationality. 2022. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (1): 114–129. DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2020.1716382.
Updating for Externalists. 2021. Nous 55 (3): 487–516. DOI: 10.1111/nous.12307.
A Model-Invariant Theory of Causation. 2021. Philosophical Review 121 (1): 45–96. DOI: 10.1215/00318108-8699682.
A Subjectivist’s Guide to Deterministic Chance. 2021. Synthese 198: 4339–4372. DOI: 10.1007/s11229-019-02346-y.
The Causal Decision Theorist’s Guide to Managing the News. 2020. Journal of Philosophy 117 (3): 117–149. DOI: 10.5840/jphil202011739.
Learning and Value Change. 2019. Philosophers’ Imprint 19 (29): 1–22. permalink.
Diachronic Dutch Books and Evidential Import. 2019. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (1): 49–80. DOI: 10.1111/phpr.12471.
No One Can Serve Two Epistemic Masters. 2018. Philosophical Studies 175 (10): 2389–2398. DOI: 10.1007/s11098-017-0964-8.
A Theory of Structural Determination. 2016. Philosophical Studies 173 (1): 159–186. DOI: 10.1007/s11098-015-0474-5
The Emergence of Causation. 2015. The Journal of Philosophy 112 (6): 261–308. DOI: 10.5840/jphil2015112618.
How to Learn from Theory-Dependent Evidence. 2014. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 65 (3): 493–519. DOI: 10.1093/bjps/axs045.
Comissioned articles and reviews
How to Trace a Causal Process. 2022. Philosophical Perspectives. 36/1:95–117. DOI: 10.1111/phpe.12174
Metaphysics of Causation. 2022. the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Review of ‘A Variety of Causes’, by Paul Noordhof. 2022. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
Review of ‘Newcomb’s Problem’, edited by Arif Ahmed. 2020. 36 (1): 171–176. DOI: 10.1017/S0266267119000178.
Drafts of Work-in-Progress
Conditional Probability Is Not Countably Additive
Comparativism About Instrumental Value
causation
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2023. Philosophical Perspectives. 36 (1):95-117
According to the theory developed here, we may trace out the processes emanating from a cause in such a way that any consequence lying along one of these processes counts as an effect of the cause. This theory gives intuitive verdicts in a diverse range of problem cases from the literature. Its claims about causation will never be retracted when we include additional variables in our model. And it validates some plausible principles about causation, including Sartorio's 'Causes as Difference Makers' principle and Hitchcock's 'Principle of Sufficient Reason'.
forthcoming. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
If the laws are deterministic, then standard theories of counterfactuals are forced to reject at least one of the following conditionals: 1) had you chosen differently, there would not have been a violation of the laws of nature; and 2) had you chosen differently, the initial conditions of the universe would not have been different. On the relevant readings—where we hold fixed factors causally independent of your choice—both of these conditionals appear true. And rejecting either one leads to trouble for philosophical theories which rely upon counterfactual conditionals—like, for instance, causal decision theory. Here, I outline a semantics for counterfactual conditionals which allows us to accept both (1) and (2). And I discuss how this semantics deals with objections to causal decision theory from Arif Ahmed.
2022. Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
2022. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
2021. The Philosophical Review 130 (1): 45–96
I provide a theory of causation within the causal modeling framework. In contrast to most of its predecessors, this theory is model-invariant in the following sense: if the theory says that C caused (didn’t cause) E in a causal model, M, then it will continue to say that C caused (didn’t cause) E once we’ve removed an inessential variable from M. I suggest that, if this theory is true, then we should understand a cause as something which transmits deviant or non-inertial behavior to its effect.
2016. Philosophical Studies 173 (1): 159–186.
While structural equations modeling is increasingly used in philosophical theorizing about causation, it remains unclear what it takes for a particular structural equations model to be correct. To the extent that this issue has been addressed, the consensus appears to be that it takes a certain family of causal counterfactuals being true. I argue that this account faces difficulties in securing the independent manipulability of the structural determination relations represented in a correct structural equations model. I then offer an alternate understanding of structural determination, and I demonstrate that this theory guarantees that structural determination relations are independently manipulable. The account provides a straightforward way of understanding hypothetical interventions, as well as a criterion for distinguishing hypothetical changes in the values of variables which constitute interventions from those which do not. It additionally affords a semantics for causal counterfactual conditionals which is able to yield a clean solution to a problem case for the standard ‘closest possible world’ semantics.
2015. The Journal of Philosophy 112 (6): 261–-308.
Several philosophers have embraced the view that high-level events—events like Zimbabwe’s monetary policy and its hyper-inflation—are causally related if their corresponding low-level, fundamental physical events are causally related. I dub the view which denies this without denying that high-level events are ever causally related causal emergentism. Several extant philosophical theories of causality entail causal emergentism, while others are inconsistent with the thesis. I illustrate this with David Lewis’s two theories of causation, one of which entails causal emergentism, the other of which entails its negation. I then argue for causal emergentism on the grounds that it provides the only adequate means of squaring the apparent plenitude of causal relations between low-level events with the apparent scarcity of causal relations between high-level events. This tension between the apparent abundance of low-level causation and the apparent scarcity of high-level causation has been noted before. However, it has been thought that various theses about the semantics or the pragmatics of causal claims could be used to ameliorate the tension without going in for causal emergentism. I argue that none of the suggested semantic or pragmatic strategies meet with success, and recommend emergentist theories of causality in their stead. As Lewis’s 1973 account illustrates, causal emergentism is consistent with the thesis that all facts reduce to microphysical facts.
chance
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forthcoming. The Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
Principles of chance deference face two kinds of problems. In the first place, they face difficulties with a priori knowable contingencies. In the second place, they face difficulties in cases where you’ve lost track of the time. I provide a generalisation of these principles which handles these problem cases. The generalisation has surprising consequences for Adam Elga’s Sleeping Beauty puzzle.
forthcoming. The Canadian Journal of Philosophy.
An indifference principle says that your credences should be distributed uniformly over each of the possibilities you recognise. A chance deference principle says that your credences should be aligned with the chances. My thesis is that, if we are anti-Humeans about chance, then these two principles are incompatible. Anti-Humeans think that it is possible for the actual frequencies to depart from the chances. So long as you recognise possibilities like this, you cannot both spread your credences evenly and defer to the chances. I discuss some weaker forms of indifference which will allow anti-Humeans to defer to the chances.
2021. Synthese 198: 4339–4372.
I present an account of deterministic chance which builds upon the physico-mathematical approach to theorizing about deterministic chance known as ‘the method of arbitrary functions’. This approach promisingly yields deterministic probabilities which align with what we take the chances to be—it tells us that there is approximately a 1/2 probability of a spun roulette wheel stopping on black, and approximately a 1/2 probability of a flipped coin landing heads up—but it requires some probabilistic materials to work with. I contend that the right probabilistic materials are found in reasonable initial credence distributions. I note that, with some normative assumptions, the resulting account entails that deterministic chances obey a variant of Lewis’s ‘principal principle’. I additionally argue that deterministic chances, so understood, are capable of explaining long-run frequencies.
choice
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forthcoming. Philosophical Quarterly
Orthodox causal decision theory is unstable. Its advice changes as you make up your mind about what you will do. Several have objected to this kind of instability and explored stable alternatives. Here, I'll show that explorers in search of stability must part with a vestige of their homeland. There is no plausible stable decision theory which satisfies Savage's Sure Thing Principle. So those in search of stability must learn to live without it.
forthcoming. Nous
My topic is how to make decisions when you possess foreknowledge of the consequences of your choice. Many have thought that these kinds of decisions pose a distinctive and novel problem for causal decision theory (CDT). My thesis is that foreknowledge poses no new problems for CDT. Some of the purported problems are not problems. Others are problems, but they are not problems for CDT. Rather, they are problems for our theories of subjunctive supposition. Others are problems, but they are not new problems. They are old problems transposed into a new key. Nonetheless, decisions made with foreknowledge teach us important lessons about the instrumental value of our choices. Once we’ve appreciated these lessons, we are left with a version of CDT which faces no novel threats from foreknowledge.
Video of a talk on this material is available here
forthcoming. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
If the laws are deterministic, then standard theories of counterfactuals are forced to reject at least one of the following conditionals: 1) had you chosen differently, there would not have been a violation of the laws of nature; and 2) had you chosen differently, the initial conditions of the universe would not have been different. On the relevant readings—where we hold fixed factors causally independent of your choice—both of these conditionals appear true. And rejecting either one leads to trouble for philosophical theories which rely upon counterfactual conditionals—like, for instance, causal decision theory. Here, I outline a semantics for counterfactual conditionals which allows us to accept both (1) and (2). And I discuss how this semantics deals with objections to causal decision theory from Arif Ahmed.
2021. Mind 131 (521): 99–127
I present a decision problem in which causal decision theory appears to violate the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) and normal-form extensive-form equivalence (NEE). I show that these violations lead to exploitable behavior and long-run poverty. These consequences appear damning, but I urge caution. Causalists can dispute the charge that they violate IIA and NEE in this case by carefully specifying when options in different decision problems are similar enough to be counted as the same.
2021. The Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (1): 114–129.
A one-boxer, Erica, and a two-boxer, Chloe, engage in a familiar debate. The debate begins with Erica asking Chloe: ‘If you’re so smart, then why ain’cha rich?’. As the debate progresses, Chloe is led to endorse a novel causalist theory of rational choice. This new theory allows Chloe to forge a connection between rational choice and long-run riches. In brief: Chloe concludes that it is not long-run wealth but rather long-run wealth creation which is symptomatic of rationality.
2020. The Journal of Philosophy 117 (3): 117–149.
According to orthodox causal decision theory, performing an action can give you information about factors outside of your control, but you should not take this information into account when deciding what to do. Causal decision theorists caution against an irrational policy of ‘managing the news’. But, by providing information about factors outside of your control, performing an act can give you two, importantly different, kinds of good news. It can tell you that the world in which you find yourself is good in ways you can’t control, and it can also tell you that the act itself is in a position to make the world better. While the first kind of news does not speak in favor of performing an act, I believe that the second kind of news does. I present a revision of causal decision theory which advises you to manage the news about the good you stand to promote, while ignoring news about the good the world has provided for you.
2020. Economics & Philosophy 36 (1), 171–176.
credence
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2023. Philosophical Studies. 180 (9): 2753-2770.
A norm of local expert deference says that your credence in an arbitrary proposition A, given that the expert's probability for A is n, should be n. A norm of global expert deference says that your credence in A, given that the expert's entire probability function is E, should be E(A). Gaifman (1988) taught us that these two norms are not equivalent. Stalnaker (2019) conjectures that Gaifman's example is "a loophole". Here, I substantiate Stalnaker's suspicions by providing characterisation theorems which tell us precisely when the norms give different advice. They tell us that, in a good sense, Gaifman's example is the only case where the two norms differ. I suggest that the lesson of the theorems is that Bayesian epistemologists need not concern themselves with the differences between these two kinds of norms. While they are not strictly speaking equivalent, they are equivalent for all philosophical purposes.
forthcoming. The Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
Principles of chance deference face two kinds of problems. In the first place, they face difficulties with a priori knowable contingencies. In the second place, they face difficulties in cases where you’ve lost track of the time. I provide a generalisation of these principles which handles these problem cases. The generalisation has surprising consequences for Adam Elga’s Sleeping Beauty puzzle.
forthcoming. The Canadian Journal of Philosophy.
An indifference principle says that your credences should be distributed uniformly over each of the possibilities you recognise. A chance deference principle says that your credences should be aligned with the chances. My thesis is that, if we are anti-Humeans about chance, then these two principles are incompatible. Anti-Humeans think that it is possible for the actual frequencies to depart from the chances. So long as you recognise possibilities like this, you cannot both spread your credences evenly and defer to the chances. I discuss some weaker forms of indifference which will allow anti-Humeans to defer to the chances.
2021. Nous 55 (3): 487–516..
The externalist says that your evidence could fail to tell you what evidence you do or not do have. In that case, it could be rational for you to be uncertain about what your evidence is. This is a kind of uncertainty which orthodox Bayesian epistemology has difficulty modeling. For, if externalism is correct, then the orthodox Bayesian learning norms of conditionalization and reflection are inconsistent with each other. I recommend that an externalist Bayesian reject conditionalization. In its stead, I provide a new theory of rational learning for the externalist. I defend this theory by arguing that its advice will be followed by anyone whose learning dispositions maximize expected accuracy. I then explore some of this theory’s consequences for the rationality of epistemic akrasia, peer disagreement, undercutting defeat, and uncertain evidence.
2019. Philosophers’ Imprint 19 (29): 1–22.
Accuracy-first accounts of rational learning attempt to vindicate the intuitive idea that, while rationally-formed belief need not be true, it is nevertheless likely to be true. To this end, they attempt to show that the Bayesian’s rational learning norms are a consequence of the rational pursuit of accuracy. Existing accounts fall short of this goal, for they presuppose evidential norms which are not and cannot be vindicated in terms of the single-minded pursuit of accuracy. I propose an alternative account, according to which learning experiences rationalize changes in the way you value accuracy, which in turn rationalize changes in belief. I show that this account is capable of vindicating the Bayesian’s rational learning norms in terms of the single-minded pursuit of accuracy, so long as accuracy is rationally valued.
2019. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (1): 49–80.
A handful of well-known arguments (the ‘diachronic Dutch book arguments’) rely upon theorems establishing that, in certain circumstances, you are immune from sure monetary loss (you are not ‘diachronically Dutch bookable’) if and only if you adopt the strategy of conditionalizing (or Jeffrey conditionalizing) on whatever evidence you happen to receive. These theorems require non-trivial assumptions about which evidence you might acquire—in the case of conditionalization, the assumption is that, if you might learn that e, then it is not the case that you might learn something else that is consistent with e. These assumptions may not be relaxed. When they are, not only will non-(Jeffrey) conditionalizers be immune from diachronic Dutch bookability, but (Jeffrey) conditionalizers will themselves be diachronically Dutch bookable. I argue: 1) that there are epistemic situations in which these assumptions are violated; 2) that this reveals a conflict between the premise that susceptibility to sure monetary loss is irrational, on the one hand, and the view that rational belief revision is a function of your prior beliefs and the acquired evidence alone, on the other; and 3) that this inconsistency demonstrates that diachronic Dutch book arguments for (Jeffrey) conditionalization are invalid.
2016. Philosophical Studies 175 (10): 2389–2398..
Consider two epistemic experts–for concreteness, let them be two weather forecasters. Suppose that you aren’t certain that they will issue identical forecasts, and you would like to proportion your degrees of belief to theirs in the following way: first, conditional on either’s forecast of rain being x, you’d like your own degree of belief in rain to be x. Secondly, conditional on them issuing different forecasts of rain, you’d like your own degree of belief in rain to be some weighted average of the forecast of each. Finally, you’d like your degrees of belief to be given by an orthodox probability measure. Moderate ambitions, all. But you can’t always get what you want.
2014. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 65 (3): 493–519.
Weisberg provides an argument that neither conditionalization nor Jeffrey conditionalization is capable of accommodating the holist’s claim that beliefs acquired directly from experience can suffer undercutting defeat. I diagnose this failure as stemming from the fact that neither conditionalization nor Jeffrey conditionalization give any advice about how to rationally respond to theory-dependent evidence, and I propose a novel updating procedure that does tell us how to respond to evidence like this. This holistic updating rule yields conditionalization as a special case in which our evidence is entirely theory independent.
Drafts
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These papers are still being revised. Feedback is very much appreciated.
I argue for a connection between two debates in the philosophy of probability. On the one hand, there is disagreement about conditional probability. Is it to be defined in terms of unconditional probability, or should we instead take conditional probability as the primitive notion? On the other hand, there is disagreement about how additive probability is. Is it merely finitely additive, or is it additionally countably additive? My thesis is that, if conditional probability is primitive, then it is not countably additive.
Nihilists about instrumental value deny that choices have any objective, instrumental values. They say that there’s no fact-of-the-matter about what a choice did to help you achieve your ends. Absolutists about instrumental value say that choices have objective, instrumental values, and this value is independent of which alternatives you could have selected instead. Here, I introduce and explore a third option, which I call ‘comparativism about instrumental value’. According to the comparativist, a choice is objectively instrumentally valuable to the extent that it leaves the world better than an alternative would. Because this varies, depending upon which alternative we consider, the only facts about objective instrumental value are comparative facts. I give two reasons to take comparativism seriously. In the first place, it better fits with natural ways of thinking about instrumental value than either nihilism or absolutism. In the second place, it affords us theories of instrumental rationality which avoid problems faced by evidential and causal decision theory.